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The limitations of monitoring immigration  
detention in Australia 
Caroline Fleay*
Australia’s mandatory detention policy allows for non-citizens without a valid 
visa to be held in sites of immigration detention on an indefinite basis. This 
means that asylum seekers who arrive without a valid visa can be detained from 
their time of arrival to Australia until their protection claim is finalised, unless 
ministerial discretion is exercised to enable their release into the community. 
Thousands of asylum seekers who arrived by boat have consequently endured 
long periods of indefinite detention in prison-like conditions in facilities 
established by the Australian government, both within Australia and in offshore 
locations. Many of these sites are in remote locations and there is limited 
monitoring provided by formal state and non-state bodies across this detention 
network that is systematic, transparent and independent. There are also few civil 
society groups and individuals with the capacity to assume a monitoring role. 
This article explores the inhibiting factors of monitoring immigration detention in 
Australia and offshore locations, and the prospects for securing systematic and 
transparent independent scrutiny should Australia ratify the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT). It also highlights the limits of an 
OPCAT-consistent monitoring system in the promotion and protection of the 
rights of asylum seekers. 
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Introduction
Immigration detention centres established by the Australian government are places 
that remain largely hidden from the majority of the population. The centres detain 
non-citizens without a valid visa, the majority being asylum seekers1 who arrived 
to Australia by boat and who can remain detained until their protection claims are 
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1 For example, as at 31 January 2015, 71 per cent of people detained in immigration detention centres in 
Australia were asylum seekers who had arrived by boat (DIBP 2015, 6).
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finalised. There is limited independent monitoring of these facilities by formal state 
and non-state bodies. There are also few civil society groups and individuals with the 
capacity to visit and provide a monitoring role. Breaches of human rights are inherent 
within a system that allows for the indefinite detention of people. In addition, as 
places where their freedom of movement is denied and their lived experiences are 
utterly reliant on those employed within the detention system, there is ‘the ever 
present potential for [further] abuse’ (Taylor 2010, 1). A regularised and transparent 
system of independent scrutiny is imperative in such environments in order to ensure 
that reports on operations across the detention network, including the impacts on 
those it detains, are in the public domain. Securing such a system would also be an 
important acknowledgement by the state that its sites of detention should be under 
such scrutiny.
While the few bodies that do visit immigration detention centres play an important 
role in shining a much-needed spotlight on this system and produce significant 
reports, little of this monitoring has been systematic and regularised across the 
detention network, nor are all of their reports placed in the public domain. In this 
regard, the monitoring of these bodies falls far short of the requirements of OPCAT 
that came into force in 2006. While Australia signed OPCAT in 2009, it is yet to ratify 
it and thus be subject to its requirements on the monitoring of places of detention.
This article explores the shortcomings of the monitoring of Australia’s immigration 
detention network and the prospects for its expansion. As this network was designed 
in an effort to deter the arrival of asylum seekers by boat, it is the detention of asylum 
seekers that will be the focus of this discussion. After first providing an overview 
of the detention of asylum seekers in Australia, the article explores the factors that 
inhibit monitoring and the criteria of a monitoring system that would be required by 
Australia’s ratification of OPCAT. It also highlights the limits of an OPCAT-consistent 
monitoring system in the promotion and protection of the rights of asylum seekers. 
The detention of asylum seekers in Australia 
Asylum seekers2 arriving to Australia without a valid visa are subject to the 
mandatory detention policy. This means that they can be detained in secure 
immigration facilities until their protection claims are finalised by the Department of 
2 According to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, an asylum seeker is someone who 
arrives in another country and makes a protection claim on the basis that they have a well-founded fear 
of persecution should they return to their own country. Once their protection claim has been accepted, 
they are considered to be a refugee. 
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Immigration,3 unless the Minister for Immigration exercises his or her discretion to 
allow for their earlier release under s 46A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). In effect, 
this is indefinite detention and, for many asylum seekers in Australia over the past 
15 years, this has meant years in prison-like conditions where there has been little 
systematic and transparent independent scrutiny. Mandatory detention was first 
adopted by the Labor government in 1991 and enshrined in legislation the following 
year as the Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) and the Migration Reform Act 1992 
(Cth). Mandatory detention was a response to the increased number of boat arrivals 
of asylum seekers to Australia, from none between 1982 and 1988 to approximately 
200 each year from 1990 to 1992 (Phillips and Spinks 2013, 22). The legislation sought 
to act as a deterrent for future asylum seekers and effectively discriminates between 
asylum seekers arriving by boat and those arriving by plane (Viviani 1996, 20–21). 
The Coalition government maintained the mandatory detention policy following its 
election in 1996 and expanded the immigration detention network to include sites in 
remote locations within Australia and on Nauru and Papua New Guinea’s (PNG’s) 
Manus Island.4 Thousands of asylum seekers remained in these sites of detention 
for many months and, for some, up to seven years (Briskman, Latham and Goddard 
2008, 112). However, by 2005 there were growing concerns about the impacts of 
mandatory detention on asylum seekers within some sections of the Australian 
community. There were also concerns expressed by a growing number of Coalition 
government backbenchers who finally persuaded Prime Minister John Howard 
to release women and children and most long-term detainees from detention. The 
monitoring efforts of the immigration detention system provided by a few state and 
non-state bodies are likely to have contributed to this, in addition to the monitoring 
and campaigning efforts of a range of civil society groups (Fleay 2010, 121–26). All 
highlighted the mental health problems associated with prolonged detention (see the 
next section of this article).
By the time of the 2007 election, and after five years of very few boat arrivals 
compared with the 1999–2002 period,5 the Australian Labor Party (ALP) introduced 
a platform that included a softening of the mandatory detention policy (ALP 2007). 
After its election, the Labor government closed the immigration detention centres on 
3 The department responsible for immigration matters in Australia will be referred to here as the 
Department of Immigration.
4 The Coalition government negotiated agreements with Nauru and PNG in 2001 to establish sites of 
immigration detention on their territory in return for increased Australian aid assistance (Briskman, 
Latham and Goddard 2008, 104–05; Metcalfe 2010, 41–42).
5 In 2001, 5516 asylum seekers arrived to Australia by boat. Over the following five years, 140 arrived 
(Phillips and Spinks 2013, 22).
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Nauru and Manus Island and announced that ‘detention in Immigration Detention 
Centres [would only] be used as a last resort and for the shortest practicable time’ and 
children would not be placed in a detention centre (Evans 2008, 7–8). 
But, as increasing numbers of boats of asylum seekers began to reach Australian 
shores,6 the Labor government expanded the immigration detention network across 
Australia once again in an effort to deter the arrival of asylum seekers (Bowen 2011). 
By the end of 2011, thousands of men, women and children had been detained in 
various forms of immigration detention for many months — for some, more than two 
years (Fleay and Briskman 2013). 
As time spent in immigration detention grew, numbers of protests within the 
detention centres increased, as did calls for their release by civil society groups 
and individuals and formal state and non-state monitoring bodies. The Labor 
government appeared to respond to this and in October 2010 announced that the 
majority of families and children would be released from detention centres by June 
2011. Although a bare majority was released by this date, it took months for other 
women and children to be released. In November 2011, the government announced 
that men not considered a risk to the community would also be allowed to leave 
detention before their protection claims were finalised. After a slow start, hundreds 
of men were subsequently released (Hartley and Fleay 2012). 
However, as numbers of asylum seekers arriving by boat continued to increase in 2012, 
as well as reports of deaths at sea when boats capsized en route, the Labor government 
adopted further policies to try to deter boat arrivals. This included re-opening the 
offshore processing centres on Nauru and Manus Island after the Migration Legislation 
Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) was passed in 
federal Parliament in August. Over 600 asylum seekers who arrived to Australia by 
boat from 13 August 2012 were detained there over the following months. 
By early 2013, there were regular reports of mental and physical health problems, 
including incidents of self-harm and suicide attempts, in both sites of detention (AAP 
2013; Barlow 2013). While some asylum seekers detained on Manus Island and Nauru 
were subsequently transferred back to Australian detention centres, others who had 
more recently arrived to Australia by boat were sent to both islands. This followed the 
Labor government’s announcement in July that all future asylum seekers arriving by 
boat would be sent to Manus Island and never resettled in Australia, and in August 
that a small number would be resettled in Nauru (Burke 2013a; 2013b). The Coalition 
6 In 2009, 2726 asylum seekers arrived by boat to Australia, compared with 360 who arrived in the 
previous three years (Phillips and Spinks 2013, 22).
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government maintained this stance following its election in September 2013 and 
also announced plans to expand the capacities of the sites of detention on Nauru 
and Manus Island (Maley and Wilson 2013). As at the end of January 2015, there 
were 1825 asylum seekers detained on the islands, including children in the Nauru 
offshore processing centre (DIBP 2015, 3).
Other asylum seekers who arrived to Australia by boat since 13 August 2012 have 
been detained in Australian immigration detention centres. By the end of January 2015, 
some 26,168 of these asylum seekers had been released into the community on bridging 
visas (DIBP 2015, 3), but with no right to work7 and only minimal financial support 
from the state, and none had yet had their protection claims finalised (Mares 2014). 
Those who continue to be detained at this time include 1382 people who have been 
held in immigration detention centres within Australia for more than one year and 
228 for more than two years (DIBP 2015, 10). These include asylum seekers recognised 
as refugees but who are of interest to, or have been charged by, the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) during the Labor government’s term in office. They face ongoing detention 
until AFP investigations are completed and any charges heard in a court (Senate Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee 2013, 147). Others are refugees who 
have been issued an adverse security assessment by Australia’s security organisation 
(Gordon 2013). They also face ongoing indefinite detention.
In summary, Australian legislation continues to allow for the indefinite detention of 
non-citizens without a valid visa, including asylum seekers who arrive to Australia 
by boat. While thousands of asylum seekers have been released from detention before 
their protection claims are finalised, given that the Minister for Immigration retains 
the discretion to do so, others continue to remain in detention for many months or 
years. Many continue to endure lengthy periods of detention in Australia and on 
Nauru and Manus Island, and legislation enshrining mandatory detention remains 
unchallenged. This is despite the findings of state and non-state monitoring bodies 
and civil society groups that call for an end to mandatory detention.
7 However, in December 2014, the former Minister for Immigration, Scott Morrison, agreed to grant 
the right to work to asylum seekers in the community as one of the concessions made to cross-bench 
Members of Parliament to gain their support for the passage of the Migration and Maritime Powers 
Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) in federal Parliament 
(Yaxley, Norman and Gul 2015).
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The limitations of monitoring immigration detention in 
Australia 
For the more than two decades since Australia adopted the mandatory detention 
policy, there have been limited monitoring mechanisms to provide oversight of the 
immigration detention system. Formal state and non-state monitoring bodies that 
visit immigration detention centres include the Commonwealth Ombudsman, the 
Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC),8 parliamentary committees and the 
Minister for Immigration’s advisory groups. Visits to immigration detention centres 
are also conducted by the Australian Red Cross and Amnesty International Australia 
(AIA), a number of UN human rights agencies, and a range of civil society groups 
and individuals. 
While these organisations and individuals have been able to undertake some 
monitoring and raise serious concerns about the impacts of long-term detention, 
this section of the article highlights the barriers they face that have meant that the 
monitoring has largely been ad hoc and, in some cases, lacking in transparency. 
Barriers include the lack of financial resources to engage in systematic monitoring 
by organisations independent of the government. Others include the reliance on 
the Australian government and its contracted managers to gain access to sites of 
detention, the added barrier of territorial sovereignty for bodies seeking access to 
sites of detention on Nauru and Manus Island, and confidentiality conditions that 
further inhibit some forms of monitoring. 
Lack of financial resources
Most organisations and individuals who have undertaken a monitoring role of 
Australian-funded immigration detention sites have been hampered by resource 
limitations. This is not just an issue of how their operations are funded but also 
reflects the number and location of Australian-funded immigration detention centres 
in remote parts of Australia, as well as on Nauru and Manus Island. Travel costs alone 
to these sites inhibit monitoring.
While both the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the AHRC have documented 
concerns about conditions within Australia’s immigration detention centres and the 
impacts of long-term detention since the late 1990s, they have had limited resources 
to do so. The Commonwealth Ombudsman’s roles include that of immigration 
oversight, giving it a mandate to inspect immigration detention centres, investigate 
complaints made on behalf of or by those detained, and make public reports. In 
addition, it is required under ss 486N and 486O of the Migration Act to assess the 
8 Formerly known as the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC).
Volume 21(1) The limitations of monitoring immigration detention 27
‘appropriateness of the arrangements for the detention of a person who has been 
in detention for two years or more’ (Commonwealth Ombudsman 2005). Regular 
reports and recommendations of the Ombudsman critical of mandatory detention 
have been tabled in federal Parliament. For example, the findings of its investigation 
into incidences of self-harm and suicide in Australia’s immigration detention centres 
in 2013 included that ‘immigration detention in a closed environment for a period 
of longer than six months has a significant, negative impact on a detainee’s mental 
health’ (Commonwealth Ombudsman 2013). However, despite its mandate, the 
Ombudsman has not had the resources necessary to conduct regular inspection visits 
of immigration detention centres. Its work has been largely ‘complaints driven’ and 
it has not been able to undertake a systematic monitoring role (Harding 2012, 4). Nor 
are its recommendations binding on the Australian government.
The recommendations of the AHRC are not binding on the Australian government 
either. However, it has been able to adopt a more systematic approach to the monitoring 
of immigration detention centres at various times over the past 15 years, including 
the publication of the observations and recommendations of the Commission’s many 
visits to detention centres. AHRC Human Rights Commissioners have consistently 
raised concerns about the impacts of detention following these visits and called 
for an end to mandatory detention (for example, see HREOC 1998; 2004; AHRC 
2011). But the expansion of the immigration detention network over the past four 
years and the lack of adequate resources to continue to visit all sites of detention 
have meant a reduction in the AHRC’s monitoring role (Branson 2012). In 2012, the 
AHRC announced that it would ‘continue to conduct short visits to detention sites 
… [but it would be] no longer able to undertake detailed monitoring and reporting 
of conditions of immigration detention’ (2012, 35). Despite this, in 2014 the AHRC 
conducted an inquiry into the impacts of immigration detention on children. This 
provided a public forum that allowed organisations and individuals with expertise 
in this area to raise their concerns, and these were subsequently documented in a 
public report that provides a damning critique of the practice of detaining children 
(AHRC 2015).
Other human rights organisations have faced similar financial barriers to monitoring 
Australian-funded detention centres in a systematic fashion across the network. 
AIA has visited a range of immigration detention centres over the past five years 
in particular, both within Australia and on Nauru and Manus Island, and released 
public reports documenting the human rights concerns it found (for example, see 
AIA 2012a; 2012b; 2013). However, funding considerations have hampered its ability 
to regularly visit all sites of detention.
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A range of civil society groups and individuals face similar financial limitations. 
There are many groups and individuals who visit immigration detention centres 
but, given the constraints of distance and travel costs, most are located in or near 
Australian capital cities. These groups and individuals provide an important source 
of emotional support to the individuals detained there and often advocate on their 
behalf. Many work to raise awareness of the abuses endemic in the detention system 
to the wider Australian community. Some seek to do both. Given the restricted 
access of the media to sites of immigration detention in Australia and offshore (see 
Media Alliance 2013), some sections of the Australian media draw on the findings of 
advocates and work with them to raise greater public awareness of the impacts of 
immigration detention (for example, see ABC Four Corners 2011; 2013).
Academic researchers are part of this broader social movement. Throughout the 
past 20 years of mandatory detention, a growing body of research has explored the 
impacts of the mandatory detention policy. Much of this research highlights that 
long-term and indefinite detention results in despair and mental health issues that 
often manifest in self-harming, and that the treatment of such anguish in detention 
is largely futile (for example, see Silove, Steel and Mollica 2001; Newman, Proctor 
and Dudley 2013). While some of this research includes visits to sites of immigration 
detention centres (for example, see Fleay and Briskman 2013), the costs of doing so 
once again effectively limit the capacity of this form of monitoring, as do restrictions 
placed on such research by government officials. 
Barriers to gaining access to sites of immigration detention
There is a range of barriers to gaining access to sites of immigration detention both 
within Australia and offshore that have been faced by various monitoring bodies. 
Within Australia, all formal and informal visits to these sites require the prior approval 
of the Department of Immigration and the contracted operators of the particular 
facility. For parliamentary committees, the access sought relies on the composition 
of their members. A number of parliamentary committees have conducted inquiries 
into immigration detention. In 2001 the parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT) visited the remote detention centres 
and made recommendations that included alternatives to detention for women and 
children, and that time limits be placed on the detention of asylum seekers (2001). 
Notably, the Committee’s report included that ‘most Committee members were 
shocked by what they saw during their visits’ in relation to:
… the despair and depression of some of the detainees, their inability to understand why 
they were being kept in detention in isolated places, in harsh physical conditions with 
nothing to do. [JSCFADT 2001, 65–66.]
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In 2008, the parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Migration conducted an 
inquiry into immigration detention in Australia and recommended that detention 
be limited to 90 days, unless there was a ‘demonstrated and specific risk to the 
community’ posed by the release of an asylum seeker (2008). Similarly, in 2012, 
the parliamentary Joint Select Committee on Australia’s Immigration Detention 
Network released its report into Australia’s immigration detention system and 
recommended that ‘all reasonable steps be taken’ to limit the detention of asylum 
seekers to 90 days (2012). However, while these inquiries can play an important role 
in monitoring the immigration detention system, their terms of reference, frequency 
and recommendations are dependent upon the Members of Parliament that comprise 
the Committees. 
Access for international bodies to monitor any immigration detention centres in 
Australia is reliant on the permission of the Australian government. Such permission 
was secured and some monitoring has been provided by UN human rights agencies 
at various times over the past 15 years. These include the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), which has criticised the long-term detention of asylum seekers in 
Australia and the offshore sites of detention on numerous occasions (2003). Other UN 
human rights agencies that have visited some of Australia’s immigration detention 
centres include the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (2002) and the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), which both produced critical 
reports. In relation to his 2002 visit to the Woomera immigration detention centre in 
a remote region of South Australia, Justice Bhagwati, the Regional Advisor for Asia 
and the Pacific of the UNHCHR, expressed that he ‘was considerably distressed’ by 
the despair he had witnessed and ‘felt that he was in front of a great human tragedy’ 
(Bhagwati 2002). The UN Human Rights Committee has also investigated the cases 
of a number of individuals detained in Australian immigration detention centres and 
found that they have been subject to illegal detention and inhuman or degrading 
detention (Sydney Morning Herald 2013). 
Access to some of Australia’s sites of detention was particularly problematic during 
the Coalition government’s previous term in office, when some of the detention 
centres prohibited visitors. For example, the Curtin Immigration Detention Centre 
in remote north-western Australia only allowed officials from relevant government 
agencies and the private operator to visit detainees while it was in operation from 
1999 to 2002. 
While the Labor government allowed for non-official visits to Australia’s immigration 
detention centres during its recent term in office, entry and the extent of access once 
inside were still dependent on permission from immigration authorities. For the 
regular visitor, this permission could vary each time (Fleay and Briskman 2013, 
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126). When a visitor wrote about the conditions in the Darwin centres for an online 
news site in August 2013, he was denied further access as a personal visitor by the 
Department of Immigration on the erroneous grounds that he was considered a 
journalist and thus should be subjected to their restricted access (Pynt 2013). Similar 
experiences are evident in the aftermath of the Coalition government’s 2013 election. 
For example, in October 2013, Victoria’s Commissioner for Children and Young 
People was denied permission by the Department to visit children held in that state’s 
immigration detention centres (ABC News 2013).
Territorial sovereignty in offshore sites of detention
Added barriers to access are evident for the Australian-funded sites of detention 
on Nauru and Manus Island, given not only their remote location but also issues of 
territorial sovereignty. For example, it was extremely difficult to gain access to the 
offshore processing centre on Nauru for more than four years following its initial 
opening in 2001. Until 2005, those who tried to visit who were not employed by the 
Australian government or by companies contracted to provide services to the centre 
were denied the required visa from the Nauruan government. This was reportedly 
due to Australian government pressures to deny such visits, and access to the centre 
was not always assured even after some Australian visitors gained entry in 2005 
(Metcalfe 2010, 206).
Access to the re-established sites of detention on Nauru and Manus Island is once 
again dependent on the permission of the sovereign state on whose land the centre 
resides. This time some international organisations have been allowed to visit. The 
UNHCR gained permission to visit Manus Island on a number of occasions in 2013, 
as did AIA later in the year, and both released public reports documenting serious 
concerns regarding the living conditions and levels of despair evident in the centre 
(AIA 2013; UNHCR 2013). AIA visited again in March 2014 after the violence at the 
site the previous month had left one asylum seeker dead and others injured (2014a). 
However, other organisations independent of the Australian and PNG governments 
did not gain access. For example, in February 2013, the PNG Migration Office denied 
permission to visit the families detained on Manus Island to ChilOut, an Australian 
community organisation that raises public awareness about the detention of children. 
The Migration Office explained to ChilOut that ‘there was a “temporary ban” on 
all international organisations visiting the processing centre’ (ChilOut pers comm, 
22 October 2013). 
Similarly, while a number of independent organisations have visited the detention 
site on Nauru, such as AIA (2012) and the UNHCR (2012), there are more recent 
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examples where permission has not been granted. AIA and the UN Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention were both denied permission by the Nauru government to 
visit in April 2014 (AIA 2014b; Barlow 2014). In an earlier move to limit international 
scrutiny, the Nauru government increased the cost of a visa for journalists from A$200 
to A$8000 in January 2014 (Jabour and Hurst 2014). 
Conditions of confidentiality 
Other monitoring bodies are subject to conditions in order to gain access to sites 
of immigration detention that largely prevent their release of public reports. This 
includes the Australian Red Cross, which regularly visits immigration detention 
centres and rarely makes public comments on these visits, consistent with its principle 
of neutrality. The members of the Minister for Immigration’s advisory group on 
detention, the Minister’s Council on Asylum Seekers and Detention (MCASD) formed 
by the Labor government in 2009, are also subject to confidentiality conditions. They 
are required to sign confidentiality agreements with the Australian government. This 
group provides advice to the Minister and the Department of Immigration on how 
conditions and policies of detention should be improved. Until the newly elected 
Coalition government disbanded it in 2013, members of the Immigration Health 
Advisory Group gave advice to the Department on matters related to health issues in 
detention centres and were similarly subject to confidentiality agreements. 
MCASD is comprised of members appointed by the Minister and has the capacity to 
regularly visit detention centres. It has arguably the most direct access to the Minister 
and the Department of all the monitoring bodies in Australia, and the most extensive 
access to the immigration detention centres in Australia. A subgroup of MCASD also 
conducts visits to the offshore processing centre on Nauru. But while MCASD has 
had relatively extensive access, the confidentiality agreements that bind its members 
mean that their concerns are raised with the Department and the Minister in private 
and they are limited in their capacity to make their concerns public.
Issues of confidentiality are also evident in relation to the privatisation of a range 
of operations within the immigration detention network and this has served to 
deepen the system’s lack of transparency. Detention centre management functions 
have been outsourced since 1997 to private corporations in all Australian-funded 
sites of detention. This includes contracts to Serco Australia worth A$1.8 billion by 
2013 (Hall 2013). Other functions within the detention network that are contracted 
and subcontracted to a range of operators include health, catering, cleaning and 
security services. Contractors have included non-government organisations such as 
the Salvation Army (until February 2014) and Save the Children Fund, which have 
provided humanitarian support services on Nauru and Manus Island. 
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Commercial-in-confidence clauses that apply to contracts between the government 
and contracted organisations mean that it is exceedingly difficult to access information 
in relation to costs and other operational matters (Loewenstein 2013, 14–24). In 
addition, research in the United States suggests that government agencies ‘that 
contract out services often are not geared up to the task of effectively supervising 
and monitoring the contractors’ (Shichor 1999, 242). In Australia, recent reports 
indicate that the Department of Immigration continues to fail to provide ‘adequate 
monitoring’ of the privatised immigration detention system (Loewenstein 2013, 21).
Accountability issues around who is responsible for what happens within immigration 
detention centres become more opaque under a system of privatisation. For example, 
HREOC’s (2004) report into the investigation into the treatment of children in 
immigration detention highlights that both the Department of Immigration and the 
private company contracted to operate many of Australia’s immigration detention 
centres attempted to avoid responsibility when reports of human rights abuses 
emerged. This confusion around responsibility is exacerbated when there are 
multiple organisations that form a complex web of contracting and subcontracting 
of functions within the immigration detention network, as there are in Australia and 
offshore.
The confidentiality agreements signed by Department of Immigration officials 
and employees of contracted organisations further inhibit the capacity for public 
reports on the impacts of detention. However, despite these agreements, one notable 
development within the re-established offshore sites of detention is the number of 
government and contracted employees who have spoken to media sources about 
their concerns for the safety and welfare of detained asylum seekers. For example, 
nine identified and 22 unidentified past and present Salvation Army employees 
released a public statement in July 2013 describing the recent riot in the Nauru site of 
detention as ‘an inevitable outcome from a cruel and degrading policy’ (Isaacs 2014, 
xviii). Past and present employees of contractors on Manus Island have also made 
public comments condemning the inhumane conditions inside this site of detention 
(for example, see ABC Four Corners 2014). In addition, serious health concerns about 
children detained on Nauru documented by medical professionals in a confidential 
report to the Department of Immigration were leaked to media sources (Laughland 
2014). Those who now plan to make such public statements, however, face a new 
concern, given legislation adopted by the Australian Parliament in May 2015. The 
passage of the Australian Border Force Act 2015 (Cth) imposes the severe penalty of 
two years imprisonment for ‘the unauthorised disclosures of information’ by those 
employed with Australia’s immigration detention network.
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The multiple barriers outlined above all serve to significantly curtail the monitoring 
activities of both formal and informal organisations and concerned individuals. 
Monitoring of Australian-funded sites of immigration detention that is publicly 
reported, and thus helping to increase the transparency of the system, continues to 
be ad hoc and limited in its scope. In relation to the offshore sites, there has been a 
particular reliance on a few international human rights agencies with the resources 
to visit, although access can never be assured, as well as employees of contracted 
organisations who have been clearly so concerned about what they are witnessing 
that they were willing to defy the confidentiality agreements they have signed. 
Establishing a system of monitoring throughout Australia’s immigration detention 
network and the sites on Nauru and Manus Island that is regularised, transparent and 
independent of the Australian government would assist with increasing the visibility 
of the impacts of immigration detention on the people it holds. The requirements that 
follow ratification of OPCAT aim to achieve such a system. However, even with such 
monitoring, significant limitations remain to bring about policy change. 
Prospects for monitoring under OPCAT
Ratification of OPCAT would require Australia to implement a monitoring process of 
all places of detention consistent with the standards outlined in the Protocol. OPCAT 
is designed to provide the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment with a preventive mechanism and:
… establishes a dual and complementary system of regular inspections or visits to places 
of detention by a single international body and one or more national organs. The aim of 
these mechanisms is to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. [Edwards 2008, 794.] 
The test for whether the OPCAT mechanisms apply in particular places of detention 
is whether a site is one where ‘people are deprived of their liberty’ (OPCAT, Art 1). As 
Australia’s immigration detention facilities do not allow for asylum seekers to leave 
at will, they would be subject to such monitoring. 
Given that the international body established under OPCAT, the Subcommittee 
on the Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, is likely to continue visiting only a sample of a signatory state’s 
places of detention at best every five or six years due to its financial restrictions 
(Harding 2012, 8), the operation of national bodies that are consistent with OPCAT’s 
monitoring requirements becomes essential. These National Preventive Mechanisms 
(NPMs) are required to be adequately resourced independent bodies and comprised 
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of individuals with appropriate expertise, ethnic and minority group representation, 
and gender balance (OPCAT, Art 18). Their responsibilities include investigating the 
conditions and treatment of people in detention, reviewing relevant existing or draft 
legislation and making recommendations (Art 19). OPCAT-consistent monitoring 
includes ‘identifying individual repression or wrongdoing’, as well as investigating 
that the ‘place of detention is being managed in a way that is decent and equitable’ 
(Harding and Morgan 2008, 19). In order to do so, NPMs need the capacity to access 
any place of detention both announced and unannounced, conduct private interviews 
with people in detention, and be provided with any relevant information (Art 20). 
Resulting concerns and recommendations from visits are to be communicated to the 
responsible government with a view to engaging in dialogue with them (Art 22), 
although there is also a requirement on the government to make public the NPMs’ 
annual reports (Art 23).
Even though there are some formal bodies that visit immigration detention centres 
in Australia, as outlined above they are not adequately resourced, nor do they have 
the capacity to provide monitoring in a systematic fashion consistent with OPCAT 
(Harding 2012). Ratification of OPCAT would clearly require Australia to either 
enhance the resources and mandate of one or some of the existing bodies with a 
monitoring role, such as the AHRC, or establish new institutions (Harding and 
Morgan 2008).
Other countries that have ratified OPCAT illustrate some of the benefits of the 
system. Reports from New Zealand, which ratified OPCAT in 2007, include that the 
monitoring process has engendered a:
… high level of cooperation by the detaining agencies and willingness to engage with 
the Preventive Mechanisms … [and] an increase in referrals from staff, who recognise the 
benefits and potential of the OPCAT mechanism to improve conditions, eliminate risk and 
prevent harm. There has also been greater engagement with civil society and community 
organisations. [Human Rights Commission (New Zealand) 2010, 2.]
In the United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP), the chief 
NPM, notes that while it has no statutory power to compel change, more than half of 
its recommendations to immigration authorities and detention operators are at least 
partially achieved. For example, according to HMIP reports published in 2011–12, 
37 per cent of recommendations were achieved in follow-up inspections and 21 per 
cent were partially achieved (HMIP 2012, 108). 
Aside from these potential benefits should Australia ratify OPCAT, there could also be 
a considerable cost benefit in adopting an OPCAT-compliant monitoring process. In 
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September 2013, it was reported that the Australian government had paid A$21 million 
in compensation for wrongfully detaining 299 people since 2000–01, and a further 
A$6.9 million in damages to ‘settle 102 claims for breaches of the government’s duty 
of care to people in detention centres’ (Uren 2013). Adopting an OPCAT-compliant 
monitoring system would arguably decrease the incidences of asylum seekers being 
wrongfully detained and subject to breaches of the government’s duty of care, and 
could help to prevent or reduce further compensation to be paid to asylum seekers. 
What is more questionable is whether Australia ratifying OPCAT would mean 
that the offshore processing centres established in other countries at the behest of 
Australia would be subject to the OPCAT provisions. Edwards argues that when:
… a deal has been struck between two States in relation to the inter-country transfer of 
asylum-seekers and/or refugees, the general position at international law provides that 
such agreements cannot lead to the release of responsibility for the sending State if it is 
aware of or can prevent mistreatment in the receiving State (such as within a detention 
facility), even if it plays no subsequent role in the day-to-day or oversight operations there. 
[Edwards 2008, 818.]
Even if such a position is accepted, a more imperative issue is whether the detention 
facilities established in other countries by Australian policy could be accessed 
according to the OPCAT provisions when the states hosting the detention facilities are 
not parties to the Protocol. In stark contrast to Australia, Nauru acceded to OPCAT 
in January 2013 and thus has an obligation to ensure that its offshore processing 
centre is monitored according to the Protocol’s requirements. However, the denial 
of permission for AIA and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to visit 
Nauru in April 2014 suggests that the Nauru government is reluctant to establish 
independent and transparent monitoring. 
PNG is yet to either accede to or ratify the Protocol. Thus, even if Australia ratifies and 
institutes a system of monitoring consistent with OPCAT, any access of an Australian 
NPM to a detention facility on Manus Island would depend on a bilateral agreement 
between PNG and Australia. While a failure to secure such access would arguably 
mean that Australia would be in breach of its obligations (Edwards 2008, 820), the 
weak enforcement measures of international law suggest that the consequences for 
Australia would be minimal unless significant domestic and international pressures 
could be brought to bear around this issue. The jurisdictional and access issues in 
relation to PNG, and arguably Nauru if its accession to OPCAT is not followed by 
the establishment of an appropriate monitoring system, are further hurdles to be 
overcome to ensure that all sites of detention established by Australia are subject to 
systematic and transparent independent monitoring. 
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Given current political imperatives to enact policies that transport asylum seekers 
arriving to Australia by boat to offshore sites of detention, it is unlikely that the 
Coalition government will engage in any such jurisdictional debate. The government 
is focused on deterrence measures and the ratification of OPCAT by Australia seems 
a very distant prospect.
But there are also significant limits to the extent to which an OPCAT-compliant 
monitoring process in Australia can protect the rights of asylum seekers. As Catherine 
Branson, former AHRC President, outlined:
… monitoring is not enough to ensure that vulnerable people are protected from breaches 
of their human rights … some people currently in immigration detention face potentially 
serious breaches of their human rights which will not be ameliorated by monitoring of the 
conditions of their detention. The human rights breaches lie … in the fact of their prolonged 
and indefinite detention. [Branson 2012.]
OPCAT-compliant monitoring of immigration detention centres cannot address the 
breaches of human rights that are inherent in the mandatory detention system itself 
as it allows for the indefinite detention of non-citizens without a valid visa. These 
breaches are regardless of the conditions within any site of detention. Indefinite 
detention is contrary to Art 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights prohibiting arbitrary detention that can be considered unjust (Brané and 
Lundholm 2008, 156). For asylum seekers, mandatory detention also arguably 
contravenes Art 31(2) of the Refugee Convention, which highlights that only those 
restrictions deemed ‘necessary’ should be placed on refugees’ freedom of movement. 
Conclusion No 44 of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR similarly expresses 
that detention ‘should normally be avoided’.9 In this regard, an OPCAT-compliant 
monitoring system can only address the consequences of the fundamental problem 
that non-citizens, including asylum seekers, are being detained for indefinite and 
lengthy periods because the mandatory detention policy that is enshrined in federal 
legislation allows for it. However, it is the capacity of such a monitoring system 
to raise further awareness within the public domain, and provide another formal 
channel for concerns to be raised directly with the Australian government, that is its 
strength. This may, in turn, help to increase both public and private pressures on the 
Australian government to further restrict or bring an end to mandatory detention.
9 See Brané and Lundholm (2008) for an expanded discussion on where immigration detention may 
contravene human rights instruments.
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Conclusion
As outlined above, there has been little systematic and transparent independent 
monitoring of Australia’s immigration detention system. That many reports of the 
state and non-state monitoring bodies and individuals who have visited detention 
centres raise grave concerns about the impacts of long-term and indefinite detention 
highlights the need for such a system to at least allow for greater transparency within 
the detention network. While recognising the limitations of an OPCAT-compliant 
monitoring system to address the human rights abuses that are inherent within the 
mandatory detention policy, such a system would at least provide a regularised level 
of transparent independent scrutiny. This may serve to mitigate the incidences of 
some abuses and elevate the experiences of those detained in the public domain. 
In the aftermath of the September 2013 election, and a campaign leading up to it 
that was characterised by both major political parties trying to ‘out-toughen’ each 
other on policies that they claimed would ‘stop the boats’, the prospects for Australia 
to ratify OPCAT continue to be remote. With the Coalition government in office, it 
appears that Australia’s ‘ambivalent human rights culture [and] oversensitivity to 
external comment’ (Harding and Morgan 2009, 117) is expanding. This will mean 
even less federal interest in becoming bound to external requirements to institute a 
process of monitoring immigration detention centres that is systematic, transparent, 
independent and well-resourced.
In the absence of such a monitoring system, prospects for shifting policy away from 
mandatory detention may be advanced through a greater understanding of the 
impacts of various forms of current monitoring on government policy, both within 
Australia and elsewhere. While some research explores this (for example, Brané 
and Lundholm 2008), further research is needed on monitoring activities and their 
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